A little over a year from the beginning of the “Arab Spring” and from the massacre in Alexandria in Egypt, the Holy See continues to use caution with the wave of popular protests that has led to the collapse of some of the most sedimentary regimes in the region and the crisis of others which appeared unassailable.
In Tunisia and Egypt government apparatus that appeared very solid have melted like snow in the sun, giving way to a difficult and confused transition where the primary role seems to be played byIslamic forces.
Which, especially in Egypt where there has been a year of growingsectarian and intra-community violence, does not leave the large Coptic component and the smallest Coptic Catholic Church in peace.
In Libya, things have taken a different turnand the Holy See, although not proposing the hard tones used during the two Gulf Wars of1990-1991 and 2003, has made it very clear that it opposes Western military intervention.
Now, with the end of military operations in Libya and while the Egyptian situation remains extremely uncertain, the attitude taken across the Tiber with regards to the Syrian crisis appears very significant.
The Levantine country, in fact, in the eyes of Rome, retains a much greater importance and sensitivity than North African countries.
Firstly, in Syria there is a significant Catholic presence, albeit divided among many different rites that sometimes seem to compete with each other rather than be allies.
Overall, however, the Catholic part of the Syrian population, like the Greek Orthodox and the Armenians, has generally found protection and support from the Baathist regime of Assad.
The Syrian government, in fact, not only is essentially secular, but also the expression of the Alawite minority, and therefore opposed to any emphasis of sectarian. Its fall could instead envisage a scenario like Iraq, characterized by a widespread anti-Christian violence and the exodus of faithful from that country.
Hence, the repeated affirmations of loyalty of many members of the Catholic hierarchy in the region in favor of Assad and against subversion “subsidized from outside”.
A charge that in the case of Greek-Catholic Patriarch Gregory III Laham took on tones at times very harsh, until the West and in particular the hated American-Israeli binomial were identified as the alleged directors of the operation.
Even apart from these extreme positions, not coincidentally very strong within the Melkite Church, always very sensitive to the sirens of Arab nationalism, it is evident how Rome is noting with concern the possible, , and now probable, end of the Baathist regime in Syria.
Also because such a shock in Damascus cannot remain without significant echoesin nearby Beirut.
Once again, in fact, the cornerstone of Holy See Middle Eastern policy is represented by the small Lebanon. A country that, during the twentieth century, has shown from time to time that religious coexistence is possible, on an equal footing between Christianity and Islam in the East or the bloody drama made up by the break in this model of peaceful coexistence between confessions.
Now we need to consider how 2011 has been very important year for the political and ecclesiastical life in Lebanon.
In fact, after twenty-five years at the head of the Maronite Church, the most important of Middle Eastern Churches in communion with Rome and the main Catholic denomination in the country of cedars, the old Cardinal Nasrallah PierreSfeir is not longer there, at the age of ninety years he decided to pass the hand with regards to patriarchal government.
His successor, Pierre Béchara Rahi, elected by the Maronite synod in March, has impressed since the beginning of a profound turning point in government policy that had followed Bkerke in recent years and which had attracted much criticism within the same community.
To understand the change impressed by Rahi it is necessary to broaden the vision toLebanese politics, where a complex electoral system and legal confessional are counterpointed by the polarization of the Christian field include and the Maronite community itself, divided between the two main coalitions which for some time now are vying for the leadership of the country.
A consistent wing of the Maronite front, more directly linked to the nomenclature that came from the civil war, is sided with the "pro-Western" alliance of March 14th.
These include the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb (Phalange) and a National-Liberal Party reduced to a minimum after the glories of the past. This component of the Lebanese deployment, quite openly, received the sympathies of Patriarch Sfeir.
The majority of Maronite Members of Parliament elected, however, is deployed in the Free Patriotic Movement and the satellite power Marada, expressions of the Block of Change and Reform, led by General Aoun and presently the pivot of the alliance of the government with the Shiite parties of Hezbollah and Amal.
From the day of his election Raï worked in the arduous attempt to restore the unity of the Christian Maronite representation, while initiating a dialogue with all political and religious components. He repeatedly stressed that the State authority should be restored and how all factions should accept the prevalence of law, agreeing to hand over their weapons and disband their militias.
During the official visit which took place in France in September and the following pastoral visit to a large Maronite diaspora in the United States, the new Patriarch of Lebanon insisted on the important of Lebanese unity and peaceful coexistence among different religious denominations, returning on the need for disarmament of political militias.
Overall similar positions in Lebanon, have caused discontent in circles close to the Lebanese Forces, which in the opening by the Patriarch seemed like backing outof the Islamic component.
Instead it was much appreciated by group tied to Aoun, where the invitation for disarmament of all factions, in fact aimed at Hezbollah, was not considered entirely negative, since it could herald a "rebalancing" of the formations between the forces currently in power.
It is more complex to assess the attitude of Rome towards the initiatives of the new patriarch, which raised so many comments and so many conflicting interpretations also at home.
It seems quite likely that the positions of Rahi, known and respected in the Vatican, are after all converging with the positions of the Holy See: with him at the leadership of the Maronite Church in Lebanon it seems in fact, that there is a return to their traditional role of a laboratory for possible coexistence, on an equal footing, between Christianityand Islam in the Middle East.
Cardinal Sfeir, on the contrary, elected in the most turbulent years of civil war, has always appeared more concerned to ensure strong cohesion within the Maronite community, rather than encourage peaceful and serene coexistence between the various religious components: On the other hand, he failed miserably in both instances.
In recent years of the patriarchal government, in fact, the positions of the elderly cardinal aroused furious controversy between the less conservative parties of the same Catholicestablishment and led to the a point of conflict, personal interests and biases never reached before in the Maronite community.
For this reason Rahi, since his election, he has attempted to recompose the various Maronite political bodies (since last spring Bkerke has hoped for a series of meetings between the main Lebanese Catholic political leaders) and once again, though without ambiguities and weaknesses, proposed the Lebanese example as a model of coexistence and mutual respect between Christianity and Islam.
A paradigm that, especially today, the Holy See considers essential to support, to provide an example to all other countries in the region, threatened by sectarian violence and political convulsions.
Faced with a similar state of affairs, more than one concern has been aroused by the absence of the neo Maronite Patriarch in the ranks of new cardinals. Many and credited forecasts believe in fact in the imminent appointment of Rahi.
With regards to this apparent rejection there may be two reasons.
The first is that Rahi was temporarily excluded to avoid humiliating the old Cardinal Sfeir, who had to wait for over eight years after his election as Patriarch to be appointed cardinal.
The second is that, faced withsuch a picture in motion, the Holy See prefers to procrastinate and avoid making decisions which appear as an incontrovertible endorsement of Rahi’s position.
The end of the Syrian regime, in fact, could dramatically change the terms of the contention: even in the small Lebanon.