Since the beginning of Pope Leo XIV's pontificate, they’ve become significantly more frequent, while drawing less media interest. Is this a sign of normalization?
The most recently announced appointment of a Chinese bishop — for Haimen, named on August 24 and announced on October 15, the day of his consecration — filled a diocese that had been without a bishop since 2023.
This is the 21st appointment (though only the 19th episcopal consecration, excluding two transfers) since Beijing and the Vatican signed a secret, provisional agreement on episcopal appointments in 2018.
More importantly, since the election of Pope Leo XIV, there has been a clear acceleration in bilateral appointments.
Pope Leo has appointed seven bishops, averaging more than four per year, compared to fewer than two per year during Pope Francis' pontificate.
Tense coexistence
China and the Holy See reached the 2018 agreement after decades of intense but discreet negotiations over episcopal appointments, beginning in the 1980s. Its primary goal is to address the coexistence of "two Catholic Churches" on Chinese soil.
The first is what is known as the official church, controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through its episcopal conference and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association — two organizations Rome does not recognize.
The second is an underground Church, which emerged after 1958 following the closing of China's borders.
It maintained its ties to Rome for years, despite the immense suffering caused by the Cultural Revolution and the regime's persecutions. Untold numbers of martyrs are the result of this persecution.
Half of Chinese dioceses lack a bishop
Compounding this challenge, numerous dioceses in China remain without bishops. Today, despite the 21 appointments since 2018, there are 68 dioceses still lacking a bishop (including Hong Kong and Macau, but excluding Taiwan).
This represents nearly half of the 145 Chinese dioceses. Furthermore, 44 of them have been without a bishop for over 25 years.
This globally unique problem largely stems from the fact that Beijing only recognizes 106 dioceses in mainland China.
The government's map of these "patriotic dioceses" features numerous variations in name, rank, and especially territory compared to Rome's map.
The patriotic church strictly aligns its diocesan map with the administrative districts recognized by the CCP. “Conversely, Rome's map is based on imperial, colonial, or arbitrary divisions that no longer make sense,” says a specialist in Catholicism in China.
Rome has created several dioceses — such as Zhangjiakou in 2025 — to align the two maps, but these adjustments remain rare.
The terms of the 2018 agreement are secret, but its main effects are known today. A candidate for bishop is first selected, usually through an election organized by the Patriotic Association in China. His name is then sent to Rome for possible approval by the pope.
Finally, the Holy See and Beijing announce the appointment publicly on the day of the episcopal ordination, with Beijing's announcement coming a few hours before Rome's.
Progress, but far from a complete solution
Beijing has occasionally ignored these rules, but it has not made any unilateral episcopal appointments since that of Bishop Shen Bin in Shanghai, which Pope Francis ultimately validated in 2023.
According to a Vatican source, the Holy See knows the compromise is far from perfect and is trying to make the process clearer and more fluid.
“Dialogue is also continuing to improve certain aspects,” the source says, explaining that the Vatican is doing everything possible to “create more opportunities for normalizing Church life in the country.”
Another important aspect of the 2018 agreement is that, in that same year, Pope Francis recognized all the patriotic bishops who had been ordained without Rome's approval and excommunicated as a result. From an ecclesial perspective, the Argentine Pope's goal was to end the division into "two churches."
However, this separation remains: The Holy See dialogues with Chinese communist institutions with the Catholic label, but doesn’t recognize them.
All the experts contacted emphasize that the underground Church continues to exist in very diverse forms. A high-ranking Roman Curia official mentions the case of six or seven clandestine bishops whom Beijing currently does not recognize.
Increasing government control
Observers also point out the great disparity in the situations Catholics face in China, whether they belong to the “official” or clandestine communities.
According to a European missionary in China contacted for this report, while the Holy See officially maintains dioceses that refer to a pre-Maoist China with no connection to contemporary reality, it often does so to “discreetly accommodate” certain clandestine communities.
This happens even in some cases where the Vatican officially recognizes the local patriotic bishop appointed by Beijing.
“The Cultural Revolution left wounds throughout society,” says the missionary, who has regularly visited the country for several decades.
An expert on the Chinese Church points to the complex case of Japan in the 19th century, where some clandestine communities refused to recognize Roman authorities even after the persecutions against the Church had ended.
At the Vatican, the 2018 agreement was presented without triumphalism as a step forward in the dialogue with Beijing, one that helps safeguard the unity of the Church in China, which was threatened by schism.
For the People's Republic of China, the theoretical unity of Chinese dioceses is seen as a way to tighten control over Chinese Catholics, who have long been suspected of being a dangerous Western fifth column.
This control over Catholics is part of Xi Jinping's broader political agenda. Since coming to power in 2013, he has sought to tighten his grip on Chinese society as a whole, not just religious groups.
A paradoxical acceleration?
Because of this, some voices have spoken out since 2018 — especially within the Chinese Catholic diaspora and the United States — denouncing the agreement as Rome's abandonment of the underground Church.
Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, bishop emeritus of Hong Kong, who comes from a family of refugees from Shanghai, even accused Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican's secretary of state, of lying about the reality in China.
At the same time, the current bishop of the former British colony, Cardinal Stephen Chow, has stepped up his contacts with members of the patriotic Church in recent years. This is an outward sign of an effective rapprochement.
The 2018 agreement was renewed for four years in 2024, compared to two-year extensions in 2020 and 2022.
Since the election of Pope Leo XIV, there has been a clear acceleration in bilateral appointments.
Pope Francis often spoke about China; for his part, unlike Pope Francis, Leo XIV has already visited China — during his time as prior general of the Augustinian order.
A complex local situation
On the ground, there's an increasingly complex local situation for Chinese Catholics.
Vatican diplomacy is looking with concern at recent pressure from Xi Jinping's government on society as a whole, and consequently on the Catholic Church.
This particularly includes the revival of an old Maoist regulation — applied differently across regions — that forbids children from entering churches.
“Everything has become much more complicated than it was in the beginning,” says a Vatican source. The Holy See, the source explains, is taking “very small steps.”
No persecution?
All those interviewed emphasize that the political and administrative pressure is real. However, an expert on Catholicism in Asia notes that it isn't accompanied by violence, much less killings of the kind seen in some Indian states or Myanmar, “which receive far less media attention than China.”
In 2020, Cardinal Parolin told the media that the Chinese government wasn't specifically targeting Catholics and rejected the term “persecution.”
A researcher who regularly visits certain Chinese dioceses notes that the accelerated appointments signal a relative normalization of Sino-Vatican relations, following Pope Francis' pontificate.
“China is a country like no other, but the fact that the pope approves elected candidates isn't shocking in itself; this is still the case in many dioceses in Europe,” he points out.
For the Holy See, the important thing is ensuring that the pope, as the guarantor of unity, always has the final word. And on this point, the Holy See has considerable experience — from the investiture controversies with the Holy Roman Empire to its confrontations with Napoleon.