Just a few days before Christmas, the former Hungarian President Katalin Novak praised church-state relations in Hungary.
“Over
the past two days, I welcomed Hungarian church leaders from inside and
outside Hungary,” she wrote on X. “This is a tradition and clearly
indicates that in Hungary, the state and the churches, Christian and
Jewish denominations work well together for the people.”
Photos in her post included religious leaders
shaking hands, bowing their heads in prayer and listening attentively
while Ms. Novak, who had performed a symbolic and diplomatic role as
Hungarian president, spoke from a podium.
As in some of her other posts
on X, she boasted about the visit of Pope Francis to Hungary last year.
In another post, she celebrated the last days of Advent, highlighting
her attendance at a crowded Mass.
(Ms. Novak resigned on Feb. 9
after a public uproar followed revelations that she had pardoned a man
convicted of helping to cover up sexual abuse in a children’s home.)
Even
as Prime Minister Victor Orban positions his government as one of the
last defenders of Christian culture in Europe, religious affiliation in
Hungary has dropped to a record low.
While
the former president emphasized a strong religiosity in Hungary, some
replies on X challenged her sense that church-state relations in the
country were perceived as strong and mutually beneficial among other
Hungarians.
One
poster disparaged Cardinal Peter Erdo, who has led the Archdiocese of
Esztergom-Budapest since 2003, accusing him of acting as a puppet of
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.
Another charged that Ms. Novak
was only “pretending” to be a follower of Christ. A third respondent
complained that the government was not addressing the real concerns of
Hungarians, noting that most people were more concerned about high taxes
than church-state relations.
The responses suggest a more complex
relationship between church and state in Hungary than the Orban
government perhaps cares to acknowledge. And even as Mr. Orban positions
his government as one of the last defenders of Christian culture in
Europe, religious affiliation in Hungary has dropped to a record low.
Hungary is a Catholic country with a strong Protestant presence, but in its latest census,
published late last year, a majority of Hungarians, 57 percent, failed
to declare an affiliation in any faith tradition: Forty percent did not
answer the question about affiliation at all, and 17 percent declared
“no religion” after being asked which church they belonged to. The
census outcome marks the first time that religious identity has fallen
below 50 percent in Hungary.
The
Catholic Church in Hungary saw the steepest loss of membership,
dropping 30 percent since the last census in 2011.
Now 1.1 million fewer
Hungarians identify as Catholics than 10 years ago.
The contemporary
decline reflects a long-term trend. Two decades ago, over half of
Hungarians identified as Catholic; today only 28 percent do.
Hungary
is a Catholic country with a strong Protestant presence, but in its
latest census a majority of Hungarians failed to declare an affiliation
in any faith tradition.
The Hungarian Catholic bishops’ conference acknowledged
that the church in Hungary is subject to the same dynamics as the rest
of Europe—societies marked by decades of secularization and decline in
traditional religious practice.
“International trends can also be
observed in the census data, from which Hungary and within this our
Catholic communities are no exception. This is also a task for the
Hungarian Catholic Church,” the bishops said in the statement reflecting
on the census data.
Gergley
Rosta, a Hungarian-born sociologist at the University of Munich, agreed
with the bishops, calling the latest numbers in Hungary a reflection of
steady and broad European secularization that reaches back—in Hungary’s
case—to change that began even before the communist era.
The secular
advance was halted briefly in the late 1980s and into the 1990s as
church membership grew, he said, possibly part of a reactionary movement
against communism.
By the end of the 1990s, however, church affiliation
leveled off before resuming a decline that continues into the new
century, he said.
But even as the Catholic Church in Hungary lost
membership steeply under Mr. Orban, it has been lavished with financial
and practical support by his government.
Botond Feledy is a political
analyst and the deputy director at the Jesuit European Social Center in Brussels. He said that when Mr. Orban and his Fidesz Party
gained leadership in 2010, most of the church property nationalized
under communism remained under the control of the Hungarian government.
Seeking
to firm up public support for his political agenda, Mr. Orban sought
first to improve relations with faith groups in Hungary, particularly
the Catholic Church and the Calvinist Reformed Church, the largest
Protestant denomination in the country. Returning confiscated properties
was one way to improve his standing with Hungary’s churches.
The
property restoration, said Peter Zachar, a political scientist at the
Ludovik University of Public Service, was a tremendous opportunity for
the Catholic Church to rebuild its institutions in the post-communist
era.
According to Mr. Zachar, from 2010 to 2020, the number of Catholic
primary schools in Hungary almost doubled,
increasing from 9.4 percent of all schools in Hungary to 17 percent.
Secondary schools increased from 10.4 percent to 25 percent of all high
schools.
Exploiting
such culture-war issues, Prime Minister Orban has flooded Hungarians
with “excessive propaganda on illegal migration and L.G.B.T.Q. issues.”
Other
church institutions like nursing homes and services for the poor have
also increased. And under Mr. Orban, Hungarian taxpayers are footing the bill for the maintenance and upkeep of churches, Mr. Zachar said.
“Many
believers are pleased that their church building has been renovated,
that the village parish has new and modern heating in its communal areas
and a modern church-run school, and that the church has a strong and
assertive presence in the media,” Mr. Zachar said.
In 2016, responding to the migrant crisis that first erupted across Europe in 2015,
Mr. Orban also established the State Secretariat for Assistance to
Persecuted Christians within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as
Hungary Helps, a
state-funded development agency that provides aid to Middle Eastern and
African countries with a particular focus on assisting persecuted
Christians to allow them to remain in their homelands.
“As a
result of [the secretariat’s] existence, the government, and Viktor
Orban in particular, is happy to meet with church leaders, to invite
bishops of the Christian churches of the Middle East to Hungary and to
project the image of [Hungary as the] ‘bastion of Christianity’ to the
outside world,” Mr. Zachar said.
He adds that Mr. Orban, a
Reformed Calvinist, is also regularly seen attending Catholic services
and that “members of the government he leads feel obliged to regularly
report on their presence at religious events.”
The prime minister
“considers churches as allies, his friends, and the historic churches
didn’t reject the friendship,” Mr. Rosta said.
The politicization of faith has made charitable debate nearly impossible.
According
to Mr. Zachar, that alliance has led to some confusion about the role
of church leaders and even popular resentment against the church in a
nation that, despite the intentions of its leadership, remains a
fundamentally secular state and society.
And, as the disgruntled replies
to Ms. Novak suggest, many Hungarians sense that churches have let
themselves be captured by Mr. Orban.
The reality is a bit more
complicated, Mr. Zachar believes. Rhetorically, Fidesz positions often
overlap with basic Catholic doctrine, insisting that marriage can only
be between a man and woman, for example, a position recently written
into the Hungarian constitution by the Orban government.
But even as
Pope Francis has praised Hungary for upholding “traditional values,” he
has strongly criticized its opposition to receiving Middle Eastern and
African refugees.
Mr. Orban’s government ran a pro-life campaign
in 2011, but according to Mr. Rosta, “there was never a serious
discussion about changing the abortion law,” which allows broad access
to abortion for up to 12 weeks and under certain circumstances up to 24
weeks. When it became clear that restricting abortion would result in
losing votes, Mr. Orban stopped pressing the issue, he said.
Freedom
of worship is enshrined in the Hungarian constitution, so any
denomination can open a church.
But churches can also establish legal
status that allows them to enter into service agreements with the
government, receive funding from tax payments from church members (a
common arrangement in Europe) or teach religion in public schools.
The
controversial Act on Churches, passed in 2012, revoked that status among
many small churches and denominations and changed the approval process.
Previously
the outcome of a judicial review, approval for the highest status that
allows teaching in public schools, is granted now by a two-thirds
majority vote in parliament. Many see the law as a move by Mr. Orban to
exert more control over Hungarian churches.
The prime minister “considers churches as allies, his friends, and the historic churches didn’t reject the friendship.”
Mr. Zachar noted that the Christian self-identification of the Orban government has been founded principally on two issues—keeping
non-Europeans and presumably non-Christian asylum seekers out of
Hungary, and taking a stand against gay marriage and transgender issues.
Fidesz, known for its well-oiled propaganda machine, intensely
leverages the culture war for political purposes that can have negative
secondary effects on Hungary.
The politicization of faith has made
charitable debate nearly impossible, Mr. Zachar said. “The existing
political trenches deepened and walls between different social groups
rose even more,” he said. “Reconciliation has become even more
difficult, the possibility of understanding is very far away.”
“L.G.B.T.Q.
issues have been present in Hungarian society since the [end of
communism] but never as issues of such importance that they have
dominated the entire social public sphere,” Mr. Zachar said. Now “it has
become one of the most important debates and one of the most divisive
issues.”
Mr. Zachar said that in exploiting such
culture-war issues, Mr. Orban has flooded Hungarians with “excessive
propaganda on illegal migration and L.G.B.T.Q. issues.”
Mr.
Orban’s government passed a controversial law in 2022 that bans public
showings of L.G.B.T.Q. content to minors. As a result of such campaigns,
according to Mr. Zachar, “the general public unfortunately confuses the
commission of real crimes with the L.G.B.T.Q. community.”
According
to Mr. Rosta, there is no direct evidence linking Mr. Orban’s
politicization of faith and values to diminished church affiliation, nor
has the Hungarian Catholic Church been shaken by the kinds of scandals
that has demolished church identity in other European states like
Ireland.
But social surveys conducted over the last decade suggest
a possible source of disquiet, he said, tracking a growing sense among
Eastern Europeans that churches are too involved in politics.
A recent
study from the International Social Survey Program
found that Hungarians increasingly believe that churches have too much
power, a position steadily on the rise in Hungary since 2008.
“The
proximity of religion and politics” over the last decade and more, Mr.
Rosta said, may explain why far fewer Hungarians are now willing to
describe themselves as members of a contemporary church.