The law— which will take effect after it is signed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who strongly supported its passage— will effectively outlaw the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which has historically been allied with the Moscow patriarchate.
And it will undoubtedly create new turmoil and uncertainty among the Orthodox faithful, already split into rival camps, in a country with a very strong Orthodox tradition.
The leaders of the UOC, while not renouncing their canonical ties to Moscow, have asserted their independence, distancing themselves from the Russian Orthodox Church and its stalwart support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
But the Moscow patriarchate has not acknowledged any separation, leaving the UOC in an awkward position. Some observers speculate that the UOC could apply to the Patriarch of Constantinople for recognition as an autocephalous (self-governing) Orthodox body.
However, Constantinople has already given its recognition to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), a body with which the UOC has had a bitter rivalry.
Moscow’s anger
The Russian Orthodox Church, which claims Ukraine as its canonical territory, denounced the new law in fiery terms, saying that it “can surpass all former historical repressions against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”
The statement compared the likely effects of the law to the persecutions in Rome under Nero and Diocletian, the attacks on religious institutions during the French Revolutoin, and “the destruction of the Albanian Orthodox Church under Enver Hoxha’s regime in the 1960s.”
(The statement from Moscow did not mention the Stalinist repression of religious groups.) The patriarchate charged that the current government of Ukraine “has systematically, step by step trying to weaken, split and destroy the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”
The purpose of the campaign against the UOC, the Moscow patriarchate suggests, is to weaken the historical links between Ukraine and Russia.
The statement from the Russian Orthodox Synod blames not only the government but other religious groups that are not tied to Moscow, including the Byzantine-rite Ukrainian Catholic Church.
Pointedly refusing even to name the major Orthodox group that has broken with the Moscow patriarchate, the statement repeatedly mentions the influence of “schismatic organizations.”
Threats to religious freedom
While the rhetoric from the Russian Orthodox Church is incendiary, neutral reporters have generally agreed with Moscow’s statement that “the law directly targets the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, that it is aimed at liquidating it and all its communities or at forcibly transferring them to other religious organizations.”
An AP story on the passage of the legislation carried the revealing headline: “Ukraine’s parliament approves ban on Moscow-linked religious groups. One church is seen as a target.”
The clear intent to eliminate one religious body raises obvious questions about violations of religious freedom. UOC representatives have vigorously opposed the measure on those grounds.
And the office of the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights has taken an interest in the matter, issuing a statement: “We are aware of the adoption of this law by the Ukrainian parliament and are in the process of obtaining the law and analyzing its provisions.”
On the other hand the most visible leader of the Catholic Church in Ukraine, : Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, has indicated his support for the legislation, saying that it is a necessary counter to the efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church to exploit the faith as “a tool of militarization” in the current conflict.
Invocations of religious freedom are a two-edged sword in Ukraine today, because while the Ukrainian government has arrested a number of UOC clerics on charges of subverting the country’s war effort, priests of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the OCU have been detained in those sections of the country currently under Russian military control.
The Orthodox rivalry
At first glance, a simple solution to the crisis that has been created among the Orthodox churches in Ukraine would seem to be a merger of the UOC and the OCU. But a history of animosity between the two groups could impede any steps toward union.
The OCU itself is the result of a previous attempt to resolve conflicts among the Orthodox leaders of Ukraine.
The Patriarchate of Constantinople recognized the OCU as the only legitimate representative of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, in a bid to settle a dispute that arose when, after Ukraine broke from Soviet rule, the prelate recognized by Moscow as leader of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church declared his independence - a move that Moscow never accepted.
The UOC has always accepted Moscow’s view that the OCU is a “schismatic” body, without canonical legitimacy, and the two bodies have frequently quarreled over the ownership of parish properties.
Faced with the possibility that some clerics of the UOC would go underground rather than accept affiliation with the OCU, the Patriarchate of Constantinople could intervene once again, attempting to act as broker to forge a new alliance.
But any such effort would encounter resistance as well, since Constantinople is now locked in conflict with Moscow over conflicting claims of pre-eminence in the world’s Orthodox leadership.