The head of the church also emphasises that the historical change in the life of the country since the persecution of the church during the Soviet era is not only reflected in the construction of thousands of churches, but also in the faith of the head of state.
"Putin is not a visiting parishioner or someone who imitates the religion of the majority," the patriarch said in a recent sermon. Cyril added that the head of state was not ashamed to go to church or receive the Holy Mysteries of Christ. "This is important for the whole nation as a good example of a good Christian."
In view of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the words of the Moscow church leader seem to be from another world - especially in view of the current situation in the conflict.
However, since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, resistance to the war has also been stirring within the ROC - with dramatic consequences for those affected.
In February 2022, almost 300 clergy signed an Open Letter for Peace.
An unprecedented act in Putin's Russia. Many of them are now facing criminal proceedings, repression or ecclesiastical penalties.
A report by the Orthodox Christian Studies Centre at Fordham University for the UN documents this persecution and speaks of a "profound distortion of the Orthodox tradition".
For example, the Moscow priest Johannes Koval was immediately removed from office and fled Russia in 2023 because he prayed for peace in a church service instead of - as prescribed - for "victory".
An altar boy reported this to the Moscow Patriarchate immediately after the service.
Another example are two young Orthodox seminarians, Denis Popovich and Nikita Ivankovich.
They have been in a secret service prison since February 2025 after private conversations criticising the war via messenger and fear charges.
According to the UN report, more than 100 clergy and believers of all denominations have been persecuted for opposing the war and dozens have been convicted, suspended or removed from office.
The fact that an informer disguised as an altar boy immediately reported the Moscow priest to the patriarchate shows how intertwined the church and state are. This case also indicates how closely the secret services still co-operate with the ROC today.
However, it is also known that the ROC is far more than just a religious institution for millions of believers - it also serves the Kremlin as a geopolitical tool. This connection is nothing new, as church representatives were already closely intertwined with the state and the secret services, such as the KGB, in Soviet times.
As the two examples above show, many Orthodox clergy are still loyal not only to the head of the church, but also to the head of state.
But this was not always the case: even though quite a few clerics actively worked for the Soviet secret service, some opposed the system - then as now.
Mikhailov and Drovsdov
The current head of the church, Patriarch Cyril, symbolises the intertwining of church and state like no other. His real name is Vladimir Gundyaev and, according to Swiss files, he is said to have worked for the KGB as Moscow's representative at the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Geneva under the pseudonym "Mikhailov".
A dossier on "Monsignor Kyrill" is available in the Federal Archives in Bern, for example, reported several media outlets such as the FAZ, the Spiegel. There are 37 entries in his file between July 1969 and February 1989.
The aim of the KGB in the 1970s and 80s is said to have been to influence the Swiss Federal Council and the church environment in order to respond to criticism of the assessment of religious freedom in the USSR.
Instead, the USA and its allies were to be criticised. The Moscow Patriarchate remains silent on the accusations, as does the WCC - but not Kyrill's nephew, Geneva Archpriest Mikhail Gundjajew. He denies the allegations and defends his uncle: Cyril was not an agent of the KGB, but he was under the "strict supervision" of the secret service.
His predecessor, Patriarch Alexy II, head of the ROC for a long time, is also said to have collaborated with the secret service. He is said to have been active for the KGB as early as 1958 under the code name "Drowsdow".
Although the ROK rejected the documents in question as forgeries, Alexey himself remained silent about the allegations. This fuelled doubts about his independence. The accusations were made immediately after his death.
A British research institute described him as a probable informant There is evidence that the KGB led him under the aforementioned alias. As the head of the Oxford Keston Institute for Religious Affairs in Communist States, Xenia Dennen, said, it is said to have been customary for every Moscow bishop to report to the KGB. Alexy was no exception.
"There was only a very small minority who completely refused to co-operate," Dennen explained.
Resistance - futile?
Alexander Vladimirovich Men, a theologian and biblical scholar, for example, refused to collaborate with the secret service in any way. He was murdered in 1990 under unexplained circumstances - on behalf of the KGB, many media outlets suspect. He was one of the leading Russian Orthodox theologians of the 20th century. He had been under surveillance by the secret service since the 1960s, his home was searched several times and he was summoned for questioning.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he gained popularity, but was attacked by nationalists and anti-Semites because of his Jewish origins and ecumenical views. Although the government set up a commission of enquiry, the results were never presented. The chairman of the commission, for example, was also murdered.
Since 1995, the Catholic Academy of the Diocese of Rottenburg-Stuttgart and the Old Russian Library of Foreign Literature in Moscow have awarded the Alexander Men Prize annually to personalities who have promoted dialogue between Russia and Germany.
Another priest of the ROC also opposed Soviet oppression: Dmitri Dudko. In the 1970s, he had openly denounced the brutalisation of everyday Soviet life in Moscow - until his arrest by the KGB in 1980. He was forced to recant his criticism in a staged television confession.
He later remained true to this new line, but disappointed many of his supporters, especially after he praised authoritarian figures such as Stalin and Putin.
"Soft power" instead of weapons of war
In the present day, however, resistance continues in various forms. As the report for the UN mentioned at the beginning shows, at least 27 Orthodox clergymen have voluntarily resigned from active service because they did not want to serve in a "morally compromised" environment.
Meanwhile, the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople has quietly accepted over 30 priests and deacons - including those who were suspended or removed from office by Moscow because of their positions. These clerics now look after Russian emigrant communities throughout Europe.
Moscow continues to rely on the church as a foreign policy instrument to this day. Other examples of the intertwining of the secret service and the church show how closely linked these two sides are.
Bulgaria, for example expelled the Russian archimandrite Vasian and two employees in 2023 on suspicion of espionage. Sweden cut state funding for churches with links to the Moscow Patriarchate in 2024. Warnings were also issued about sabotage and influence operations.
The Czech secret service also investigated the ROK and imposed sanctions on Cyril - for his support of the war in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, the ROK continues to work for the Kremlin - and uses its "soft power" to do so: it spreads Russian values and narratives, particularly in the Balkans and the Middle East. Instead of using tanks, it uses culture, diplomacy and religious ties to exert influence.
The close intertwining of faith and power, which began in the Soviet era, still characterises the church today - and casts doubt on its credibility as a spiritual institution.
Whether and how the church can free itself from this grip will remain one of the decisive questions for its future.