The Church in China and the
Vatican are slowly recovering slowly from the shocks suffered at the
end of last year and at this stage, both in the Holy See and in China,
there are those who no longer attach too much importance to diplomatic
relations.
The first shock came on November 20, 2010, when Fr Joseph Guo Jincai was ordained Bishop of Chengde (Hebei) without papal mandate.
The
ordination took place in the church of Pingquan (Chengde) in the
presence of eight official bishops, all legitimate, that is in communion
with the Holy See. According to information of faithful
from other dioceses, these bishops were forced to attend the ceremony,
which offends communion with the pope.
An even greater setback for the Vatican and the Church
arrived when at least 40 bishops were compelled by force to take part in
the Assembly of Representatives of Chinese Catholics, a body Benedict
XVI considers contrary to the Catholic faith.
According to the Catholic
Church, Bishops should always be the leaders of such assemblies, however
in this case they are placed on a par with other members, and often are
in a minority.
The Assembly was held in Beijing December 7 to 9, 2010,
and saw the election of the new leadership of the Council of Chinese
bishops (not recognized by the Pope because it does not include
underground bishops) and the Patriotic Association, whose aims are
irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine.
Thanks to the intelligent manoeuvrings of the Communist
Party, Joseph Ma Yinglin, (illegitimate) Bishop of Kunming was voted the
new chairman of the Council of Chinese bishops, Mgr. Johan Fang Xinyao of Linyi (in communion with the Pope) is instead the new leader of the Patriotic Association.
In this way, a body composed of bishops, is being led by a
person not in communion with the Pope, while in the other case, a
bishop in communion with the pope is placed in charge of a body contrary
to the Catholic faith. The goal of all these decisions was
to render reconciliation between the official and underground church
difficult after the pope's Letter (of 2007) which called for a greater
unity. It must be said that this unity was beginning to bear some fruit.
In both cases, the Vatican issued two statements strongly
criticizing the Patriotic Association and the person who appears to be
pulling the strings behind the scenes, layman Anthony Liu Bainian, vice
president of the Association. While addressing the
government with respect and leaving a small opening for possible future
dialogue, both documents openly denounce the apparent lack of religious
freedom and these "unacceptable and hostile acts."
From December until today, the Church in China has been
trying to rebuild unity, with great difficulty, between official and
underground Catholics. For the latter, in fact, the
official bishops were too weak and submissive, disobeying the
instructions of the Vatican (which explicitly asked them not to
participate in events and acts contrary to communion with the Holy
Father).
Among many official bishops there is embarrassment and pain for having been dragged into such an ambiguous situation. After the Assembly, because of their shame, some bishops hid in their houses for days, not wanting to meet with the faithful. Others
appear to be on the slippery slope towards an absolute patriotism,
contenting themselves with the space given them by the regime and
critical of the Vatican “unable to understand” the specific motivations
of China (in short a faith subject to government control).
This is all a source of immense disappointment, because
it was thought that China had, to some extent, embarked on a peaceful
path towards respect for religious freedom that would have eventually
led to diplomatic relations. Even in the Vatican - which
until now had been ready to accept any compromise with Beijing, turning a
blind eye on many issues - is disappointed and frustrated.
However, China’s gesture, so hard and violent, has had
its consequences, one in particular that is shared by many lay faithful:
given that Beijing is not ready to accept that it is the Holy See that
ordains bishops, the Vatican is better off slowing down efforts towards
establishing diplomatic relations.
Bishops, official and underground, now believe that their
most urgent task is to strengthen the unity of the Church, and that
"the religious policy of the government has suffered a setback" (Wei
Jingyi, bishop of Qiqihar).
It should also be noted that even personalities from the
Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing (such as Prof. Ren Yanli) consider
this step by China a return to the atmosphere of the worst form of
Maoism.
In such a precarious situation, it seems unlikely that
low-level dialogue, which to date had characterised relations between
Beijing and the Holy See, will or can continue.
However there are those in the Vatican who refuse to give
up and still hope in a rethinking on China’s part, but it has become
increasingly clear that the Holy See must remain firm and uncompromising
in the fundaments of the faith and its politics. At the same the
Vatican is pondering how to rebuild its relationship with the Bishops,
the faithful and those who have proved themselves to be weak.
A new creative idea from the Vatican was revealed in Benedict XVI's address to the diplomatic corps. On
10 January, during the annual encounter, this year on the theme of
religious freedom, the Pope focused on the case of China, denouncing the
States suffocation of the Christian communities.
At the same time, as if to suggest a model of
Church/State relationship to Beijing, immediately afterwards, Benedict
XVI quoted the example of Cuba, a communist country, which has had
diplomatic relations with the Vatican for more than 75 years.
Later, the pope also cited positive developments with Vietnam, where authorities have "
have accepted my appointment of a Representative who will express the
solicitude of the Successor of Peter by visiting the beloved Catholic
community of that country".
The "Vietnam model" could also be used for China: it
does not imply diplomatic relations between States, but the states’
permission for the Vietnamese Catholics to have relations with the
religious hierarchies related to their faith, thus ensuring their
religious freedom. The Vatican representative to Vietnam almost
certainly will not reside in Vietnam, but will visit the country,
according to the demands of his ministry and the Vietnamese faithful.
The strong relationship between Vietnam (the "little
brother") and China (the "big brother") is common knowledge in
diplomatic circles. In the past, the two countries have copied each
other in their openings to the world economy and to the WTO. They may also copy each other with regard to relations with the Catholic Church and the Vatican.
A similar structure – along the lines of the "Vietnam
model" - has been suggested to the Holy See by some Italian bishops to
overcome the obstacle of diplomatic relations with Beijing.
They propose
the appointment of papal representatives to areas around China (for
example, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Taipei, ...) who would have the
freedom to travel to China and meet the faithful and the Catholic
bishops there.
Other personalities – who have a deep knowledge of China
and are close to the Vatican - note that the absence of diplomatic
relations is not an obstacle to the life of the Church in China, nor
does it call into question the faith of Catholics.
In other words, it is perfectly possible to support the Church in China without diplomatic relations. Indeed,
some point out that at this point diplomatic relations would tend to
alienate underground Catholics from the Vatican and humiliate the moral
authority of the Holy See, because of the way in which China is treating
its people and failing to respect human rights.
But the "Vietnam model" also has its problems: in fact it
presupposes China’s good will towards the Holy See, so as to allow this
still the choice of bishops and the pastoral visits of its
representatives.
Unfortunately, at the present time, China
feels encircled by international pressure (for example the case of the
Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo, whom Beijing calls a "criminal") and is
terrorized by domestic problems (high cost of living, inflation,
unemployment and the gap between rich and poor, pollution , ...) which are fomenting social tensions.
In addition, many dissidents, in their commitment to
human dignity and rights discover their roots in Christianity and
convert to the Christian faith. For Beijing, this unity between the dissidents and faith is their greatest fear.
The only possibility that Beijing will agree to a
compromise with the Holy See is if the Holy See offers it a guarantee
for social peace, which is the greatest need in China today.
So far, Beijing has not expressed its intentions. Meanwhile, many candidates for the episcopate, chosen by the Holy See, need to be ordained.
If Beijing gives permission for at least some of these ordinations, it would mean that it is still open to dialogue.
But
at the moment, it all seems rather difficult: Fear of a "jasmine
revolution" dominates Beijing, rather than a desire for peace with
society and with the Church.